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Gating Alleys to Reduce Crime:
A Meta-Analysis and Realist Synthesis
Aiden Sidebottom*, Lisa Tompson,
Amy Thornton, Karen Bullock, Nick Tilley,
Kate Bowers and Shane D. Johnson
Alley gates are designed to limit access to alleys and the crime opportuni-
ties they afford. Informed by the acronym EMMIE we sought to: (1) system-
atically review the evidence on whether alley gates are Effective at
reducing crime, (2) identify the causal Mechanisms through which alley
gates are expected to work and the conditions that Moderate effectiveness,
and (3) collate information on the Implementation and Economic costs of
alley gating. The results of our meta-analysis suggest that alley gating is
associated with modest but significant reductions in burglary, with little evi-
dence of spatial displacement. We also identified six mechanisms through
which alley gates might plausibly reduce crime, and the conditions in which
such mechanisms are most likely to be activated.
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Background
Alleys are a familiar feature of urban environments. They have long been
associated with crime, incivilities and undesirable behaviors. Seymour, Wolch,
Reynolds, and Bradbury (2010, p. 380) put alleys in the same category as “free-
way shoulders, train yards, abandoned waterfronts, and parking lots” which tend
to be “underutilized, underdeveloped, and often deteriorating spaces”. The neg-
ative perceptions associated with alleyways even affect property prices. Guttery
(2002) shows that properties in Dallas (USA) that are located on alleyways sell for
approximately 5% less than otherwise identical homes, which he attributes, in
part, to greater levels of crime and disorder associated with alleys.
Alleys may influence crime in several ways. They can attract offenders
because of the perceived high likelihood of available crime opportunities (e.g.
the presence of drug markets and prostitutes). They can generate crimes such
as robbery and assaults by providing a convergence setting for motivated
offenders and potential targets in the absence of capable guardians (Cohen &
Felson, 1979). They may facilitate crime through providing inconspicuous
access to alley-adjacent properties and a means by which to escape and evade
detection. And, where uncertainty exists over their management and owner-
ship, alleys can provide tempting and convenient sites to illegally discard
waste, conduct arson or paint graffiti.
For these reasons, there have been diverse attempts to reduce the undesir-
able behaviors associated with urban alleys. Drawing on evidence from seven US
cities, Newell et al. (2013) review several “alley greening” schemes whereby
unkempt and rarely used alleyways were redesigned in an effort to promote
human activity and provide a welcoming environment to facilitate neighborly
interactions. Focusing specifically on crime prevention, Kaplan, Palkovitz, and
Pesce (1978) describe dedicated police patrols of problem alleyways. Similarly
Clarke (2004) discusses examples of high crime streets and alleys being tem-
porarily or permanently closed in a bid to prevent crime and disorder.
The focus of this review is on a situational crime prevention (SCP) technique
known as alley gating. Alley gating refers to the installation of lockable gates,
usually made of steel or iron, which restrict entry to an alley or network of
alleys. Alley gates can take several forms reflecting the different uses and
users of urban alleyways: opaque or transparent, self-closing or manually oper-
ated, single-leaf or double-leaf, plain or ornate and so on. Despite the diver-
sity in alley gate design, the shared intention is to restrict alley access to
legitimate users in possession of a key or passcode and to control access to
potential crime targets.
Alley gates are generally conceived as burglary reduction measures that
restrict access to the alleys behind rows of homes. However, by limiting access
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alley gates may also reduce other crime opportunities, such as prostitution,
dog fouling and drug dealing. Additional objectives include a reduction in feel-
ings of insecurity and improvements in community cohesion. As Rogers (2013,
p. 106) writes,
Alley-gates have been packaged as a panacea for the evils of domestic as well
as non-domestic burglaries, a raft of anti-social behavioral issues and an impor-
tant device in regaining control of rarely used spaces along with the regenera-
tion of urban communities.
Objectives of the Review
Studies are available on the challenges associated with implementing alley
gates (Armitage, 2006; Johnson & Loxley, 2001), their impact on crime (e.g.
see Bowers, Johnson, & Hirschfield, 2004; Haywood, Kautt, & Whitaker, 2009)
and on community perceptions (Armitage & Smithson, 2007; Rogers, 2013;
Staunton, 2006). To date, however, there has been no attempt to systemati-
cally review the evidence on whether alley gates effectively reduce crime.
This is the first objective of this review. Our second objective, informed by
EMMIE (an acronym denoting Effect, Mechanism, Moderators, Implementation,
and Economics, see Johnson, Tilley, & Bowers, 2015), is to identify the causal
mechanisms through which alley gates are expected to reduce crime and the
conditions under which they have been found to be effective, ineffective and/
or to produce unintended negative effects. To this aim we undertake a largely
qualitative review drawing on the principles of realist evaluation and consider-
ing a wider range of alley gating studies. Our third objective is to review infor-
mation on the implementation and costs of alley gates.
The paper is organized as follows. First we provide a brief summary of
EMMIE and describe how it informed our review. Next we report our methods
and search strategy. The results then follow, organized according to EMMIE.
We finish by discussing the main findings of our review and reflect on our
attempt to integrate meta-analysis and realist synthesis methods.
EMMIE and its Relevance to the Current Review
This review was conducted in support of the What Works Center for Crime
Reduction, hosted by the UK College of Policing (CoP). One aim of the CoP is
to promote and facilitate evidence-based policing, defined as “a method of
making decisions about ‘what works’ in policing: which practices and strategies
accomplish police missions most cost-effectively” (Sherman, 2013, p. 377).
The past decade has witnessed a noticeable turn towards developing
evidence-based approaches to policing. This can be seen in several recent
GATING ALLEYS TO REDUCE CRIME 57
developments. In the US, the National Institute of Justice has launched
CrimeSolutions.gov, an online resource that distils and grades research evi-
dence on the effectiveness of various criminal justice programs. Lum, Koper,
and Telep (2011) have likewise generated the Evidence-Based Policing Matrix,
an interactive evidence translation tool which usefully summarizes a large
number of crime prevention evaluation studies. In the UK, the CoP has devel-
oped the Crime Reduction Toolkit, which rates and summarizes evidence
reported in systematic reviews of crime reduction interventions. These three
initiatives share a common purpose: that of assembling and presenting
research evidence in a manner that is relevant and accessible to crime preven-
tion practitioners and policymakers.
As with other areas of evidence-based policy (most notably medicine), sys-
tematic reviews lie at the heart of the evidence-based policing movement.
This is expected: systematic reviews are generally considered to be one of the
more trustworthy sources of evidence and occupy the top position of many
“hierarchies of evidence” (see Elamin & Montori, 2012). This is usually in the
form of systematic reviews with meta-analysis whereby evidence from eligible
studies is synthesized to compute an overall effect size and determine whether
the “what” was reliably found to “work”.
Part of the motivation for proposing EMMIE was to highlight that knowledge
of “what works” (or has been found to work) is likely to be insufficient to
achieve the sort of evidence-informed decision-making envisaged by propo-
nents of evidence-based policing. EMMIE was devised as an acronym to encap-
sulate the types of evidence that studies might provide to inform decision-
making concerning the funding and/or implementation of crime prevention
schemes, in addition to and including information on intervention effectiveness
(Johnson et al., 2015).
The initial E of EMMIE refers to the “effect” size of a policy, program, prac-
tice or intervention. The first M refers to the “mechanism” through which a
policy, program, practice or intervention brings about its effect. This is impor-
tant in determining whether what has been done needs to happen if a given
outcome is to be reproduced (or to be avoided). The second M refers to “mod-
erators” (or “contexts”)—the conditions that need to be in place for a policy,
program, practice or intervention to activate the mechanisms necessary to
produce intended effects. The I refers to issues of “implementation”. Deci-
sion-makers need to know whether and how a policy, practice, program or
intervention can be put in place and what may facilitate or impede this
(Laycock & Tilley, 1995). Finally, the second E refers to “economics”—what
the intervention will cost in relation to outputs, outcomes or benefits (see
Manning, Johnson, Tilley, Wong, & Vorsina, 2016). There are always limited
resources that can be put to alternative uses and decision makers need to
determine how best to disburse those available to them.
In this review we use EMMIE as a guiding framework for the types of
evidence we might usefully collect (or acknowledge the absence of). To
achieve this aim, we combine two distinct approaches to evidence synthesis.
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For information concerning the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of alley
gates we use conventional meta-analytic methods. For information concerning
the mechanisms, moderators and implementation of alley gates, we turn to
realist synthesis (Pawson, 2006), an alternative approach to evidence synthesis
derived from the principles and methods of realist evaluation (Pawson & Tilley,
1997). Realist evaluation is chiefly concerned with determining the causal
mechanisms responsible for outcome patterns and the contextual conditions
under which those mechanisms operate (or do not operate). In the context of
realist reviews, the aim is therefore to assess what the available evidence says
about how and under what conditions the intervention of interest (here alley
gating) has been found to be effective, ineffective and to produce unintended
negative effects. Increasingly advocated and used in improving health-related
evaluation and reviews (see, for example, Berwick, 2008; Best et al., 2012;
Davidoff, 2009; Kastner, Perrier, Hamid, et al., 2015; Wong, Pawson, & Owen,
2011), this is relatively new territory in criminology (an exception is van der
Knaap, Leeuw, Bogaerts, & Nijssen, 2008). A novel feature of this review is our
proposed method for integrating meta-analysis and realist synthesis (Figure 1),
which we will elaborate on in the sections that follow.
Figure 1 Flowchart of the review process.
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Methods
Criteria for Considering Studies for this Review
We used the following criteria in selecting studies for this review:
(a) The study must have reported an explicit goal of reducing crime through
the use of alley gates. Studies implemented by any stakeholder (law
enforcement, government agencies, private entities, citizens, etc.) that
reported the effects of alley gates implemented in isolation or as part of a
wider package of interventions were included.
To be included in our meta-analysis, a study had to satisfy point (a) above
and:
(b) report at least one quantitative crime outcome measure. These could
comprise official measures (police recorded crime data, calls for service)
or unofficial measures (self-reported levels of offending and/or victimiza-
tion). Studies that only reported non-crime-related outcome measures
(e.g. changes in pedestrian flow) were excluded.
(c) report original research findings. Systematic reviews were not included.
Where the same findings were reported in multiple publications, the study
reporting the most detailed information was included. Where necessary,
any dependency in the data was dealt with appropriately.
(d) employ a research design that enabled the computation of a reliable
effect size (for example, a (quasi) experimental study with control group
or a suitable interrupted time series design).
The shortage of experimental and quasi-experimental studies in criminology is
well recognized, particularly for evaluations of situational interventions (Eck,
2006; Guerette, 2009). This can limit the number of studies eligible for meta-
analysis. Consequently, while following the above criteria we also considered
studies that measured the impact of alley gating using simple before and after
designs and no control area. Where such studies are used in the analysis that
follows, this is clearly indicated, along with the familiar concerns regarding
the internal validity of such study designs.
Items (b), (c) and (d) did not constitute the inclusion criteria for the realist
branch of our review which, as mentioned previously, draws on a wider range
of studies in pursuit of relevant information concerning Mechanisms, Modera-
tors and Implementation. To be included in our realist synthesis, studies had
to satisfy point (a) above and report substantive information on at least one of
the items below:
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(e) Crime-related causal mechanisms activated by alley gates.
(f) The conditions needed for alley gates to activate crime-related causal
mechanisms.
(g) Theoretical content concerning alley gates and crime-related outcomes.
(h) The implementation of alley gates.
It should be noted that for the realist branch of our review, studies were
included if they reported substantive information; we did not insist on studies
reporting empirical evidence on Mechanisms, Moderators and Implementation.
This decision was based on prior research which found that information con-
cerning these factors are seldom reported in the crime prevention literature,
let alone empirically examined (van der Knaap et al., 2008).
Search Strategy for Identifying Studies and Methodological Approaches
This paper draws on studies identified as part of a wider exercise to review the
evidence on the effectiveness of access control as a method of reducing crime
in the physical environment. The keywords used when initially searching the
electronic databases were therefore broader than (although included refer-
ences to) alley gating. Overall we used four search tactics to identify relevant
studies: (1) A keyword search1 of electronic databases including gray literature
and dissertation databases2; (2) A hand search of relevant journals3; (3) A key-
word search of publications by relevant government, research and professional
agencies4; and (4) forward and backward citation searches of all studies that
met our meta-analysis inclusion criteria. No date restrictions were applied. Due
to available resources studies did, however, have to be available in English. Our
final list of studies was then checked by two recognized experts on alley gating.
1. Search terms available on request.
2. ASSIA (Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts), Criminal Justice Abstracts, Criminal Justice
Periodicals, ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), IBSS (International Bibliography of
Social Sciences), NCJRS (National Criminal Justice Reference Service), ProQuest theses and disser-
tations, PsycINFO, PsycEXTRA, SCOPUS, Social Policy and Practice, Sociological Abstracts, Web of
Science, CINCH (Australian Criminology Database).
3. These were Police Practice and Research: An International Journal and Policing: A Journal of
Policy and Practice which, unlike most criminology journals, do not routinely feature in electronic
databases and were therefore searched manually.
4. Center for Problem-Oriented Policing (Tilley Award and Goldstein Award entries), Institute for
Law and Justice, Vera Institute for Justice (policing publications), Rand Corporation (public safety
publications), Police Foundation, Police Executive Research Forum, The Campbell Collaboration
reviews and protocols, Urban Institute, European Crime Prevention Network, Swedish National
Council for Crime Prevention, UK Home Office, UK College of Policing (Polka), Australian Institute
of Criminology, Swedish Police Service, Norwegian Ministry of Justice, Canadian Police College, Fin-
nish Police (Polsi), Danish National Police (Politi), The Netherlands Police (Politie), New Zealand
Police, US National Institute of Justice. We also searched: Google, Google Scholar, Academic
Search Premier (EBSC), ProQuest Sociology, Rutgers Criminal Justice Gray Literature Database,
OSCE Polis Digital Library.
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Data Extraction for Meta-Analysis
For those studies eligible for meta-analysis, two study authors independently
extracted an explicitly defined list of items, where the information was avail-
able. This included information concerning date, location, research design,
implementation, costs and statistical outcomes.5 Any disagreements in coding
were resolved through discussion.
Quantitative Data Analysis
The quantitative analyses reported in this review included a proportional
change analysis (for studies using a before and after design), and a statistical
meta-analysis to produce a weighted mean effect size from individual effect
sizes. Odds ratios or relative risk ratios are commonly used in system-
atic reviews of place-based crime prevention interventions (e.g. Johnson,
Guerette, & Bowers, 2012; Welsh & Farrington, 2008), and are also used here.
We acknowledge that there is some controversy surrounding some aspects of
this metric, such as whether the computed statistic is in fact a risk ratio or an
odds ratio,6 and whether it sufficiently deals with over-dispersion in the data
(see Marchant, 2004, 2005). To address this, we use an approach adopted else-
where (Farrington et al., 2007; Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2008) of multi-
plying the standard error by an inflation factor (IF, in this case two) when
calculating confidence intervals.7
Another form of analysis often reported in evaluation studies of SCP con-
cerns the geographical displacement of crime—or diffusion of benefits—to
untreated nearby areas (see Clarke & Weisburd, 1994; Hesseling, 1994;
Guerette & Bowers, 2009). Displacement and diffusions of crime control bene-
fits are also increasingly considered in systematic reviews (see Bowers,
Johnson, Guerette, Summers, & Poynton, 2011; Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau,
2012; Johnson et al., 2012; Telep, Weisburd, Gill, Vitter, & Teichman, 2014).
We do so here where data permit. Research also suggests that benefits can be
diffused in time as well as space, whereby the effects of intervention persist
after an intervention has ceased (Sherman, 1990) or are realized before imple-
mentation begins or is completed (Johnson & Bowers, 2003; Smith, Clarke, &
Pease, 2002). Regarding the latter, the staggered implementation of alley
5. A full list of these items is available on request.
6. Farrington, Gill, Waples, and Argomaniz (2007) have recently referred to the test statistic as a
measure of relative effect size when evaluating place-based interventions rather than an odds
ratio. As the distinction may be seen as largely semantic, we use the term odds ratio here but
acknowledge the issue.
7. Doing so leads to larger confidence intervals and a more conservative test. However, it should
be acknowledged that it is still possible that the true effect size will not be captured by the inter-
vals derived.
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gates might have anticipatory benefits insofar as offenders aware that preven-
tion activity was planned would be uncertain of where or when treatment
would next occur, thus avoiding untreated areas too. Although plausible, in
practice none of the studies we identified considered or attempted to measure
anticipatory benefits.
Realist synthesis
The approach taken in the realist branch of our review differed from that of
our meta-analysis. A key objective of any realist synthesis is to better under-
stand the conditions in which different outcome patterns are generated. To
this end, proponents of realist synthesis argue that a wider range of evidence
types can legitimately be drawn on than with a meta-analysis (see Pawson,
2006). The issue is that of eliciting and refining working theories and assem-
bling the strongest available evidence to test them. The above four search tac-
tics produced our initial population of studies. Our realist review was a largely
qualitative process involving three members of the research team reading,
rereading and regularly discussing the full text of all identified research arti-
cles deemed relevant to alley gating. We drew on reported findings to help
develop and refine working theories for alley gating as a crime reduction
method. Following this, ad hoc iterative searches were made for further evi-
dence to supplement the material assembled through the systematic search
processes.
Results
Search Results and Screening
Our initial searches on the broad topic of access control identified over 10,000
potentially eligible records (excluding duplicates). Screening of the titles and
abstracts resulted in 1,142 records remaining. We then narrowed our searches
to those reports relevant to alley gating. The full text of eighty-nine candidate
studies were sought and examined independently by the same two review
authors using the inclusion criteria described previously. Disagreements were
resolved by discussion and, where necessary, through the involvement of a
third reviewer. Of the eighty-nine candidate studies, the full text of 3 could
not be located and a further 43 did not meet our inclusion criteria. Forty-three
studies were therefore judged relevant to alley gating, all of which were
reviewed as part of our realist synthesis. Of these 43, 6 used a quasi-experi-
mental design and were eligible for meta-analysis. Most studies were ineligible
due to inadequate research designs with which to compute an effect size.
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EFFECT: Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Alley Gating on Burglary
Pre-post studies (proportional change)
Evaluation designs that include data for a control area (or areas) are preferred
to those that do not, since they allow for a more reliable estimate of the
counterfactual. However, because few studies identified through our searches
reported data for control areas (n = 6), we first analyzed the more complete
pre-post data before focusing solely on the data from quasi-experimental stud-
ies, acknowledging that some of these studies had low internal validity and
that the findings of our proportional change analysis should therefore be
interpreted cautiously. In doing this we adopt the same strategy as others
faced with similar limitations in the primary studies available (e.g. Weisburd
et al., 2008).
The included studies were all based in the UK and exclusively examined the
crime type of burglary. Data were available for simple counts of burglary for
comparable periods of time before and after intervention for 10 geographic
locations, reported across 9 studies (shown in Figure 2). To examine changes in
burglary levels across these 10 locations, we computed proportional change
Figure 2 Proportional change in burglary following the installation of alley gates for 9
studies (10 locations) with data pre- and post-intervention.
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scores and an overall mean fixed effect size. The values shown in Figure 2
range from zero (no change) to 1 (100% reduction). In addition, we computed
confidence intervals for each estimate, and an overall measure of effect size
(also shown in Figure 2). Confidence intervals were computed using the method
described in Lipsey and Wilson (2001), which is summarized in Appendix 1, as
is the formula used to compute the overall weighted measure of effect.
Consistent with the hypothesis that alley gating is associated with reductions
in burglary, relative to the period before intervention the count of burglary
was lower in all treatment areas post-intervention. The overall weighted mean
effect size suggests that this reduction was typically about 43% (fewer burglar-
ies), while the 95% confidence intervals suggest that the effect was reliable
and that the true effect ranged between 39 and 48%.
Quasi-Experimental Studies
Six studies reported data for the count of burglary pre- and post-intervention
in both treatment and control areas, thereby permitting a more reliable meta-
analysis. Locational information for each study is given in Table 1, but in sum-
mary, all schemes took place in the UK; two in the North of England, three in
the Midlands and one in the South. Before presenting the findings of our meta-
analysis, we first report a re-analysis of data originally collected by one of
these six eligible primary studies (Bowers et al., 2004), in which the data
structure enabled us to estimate the effect of alley gating for a smaller unit of
analysis than was possible with the other studies, namely a gated street block
rather than an entire area. Given the small number of studies eligible for
meta-analysis, we decided to take advantage of access to these primary data
to investigate how consistent the overall effect of alley gating was across
these individual housing blocks.
Table 1 Estimated cost of alley gates across six British studies
Author and date Setting
Number of alley
gates installed Cost per gate (in £)
Agar (2011) Enfield, UK 88 1,090.91*
Bowers et al. (2004) Merseyside, UK 3,178 659.00
Kay et al. (2002) Selly Oak, UK 103 158.00
Sturgeon-Adams et al. (2005) Hartlepool, UK 14 1453.21*
Thompson et al. (2002a) Fordbridge, UK 44 792.73
Thompson et al. (2002b) Stirchley, UK 62 212.00
Notes. The costs reported here relate to the time the study took place. Inflation and other
financial changes over time might therefore mean that these price estimates might not be directly
comparable between studies.
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Reanalysis of data reported in Bowers et al. (2004)
Bowers et al. (2004) report changes in burglary levels observed in 108
gated blocks of around 362 homes in Merseyside (standard deviation = 417,
range = 6-3,190 households per block) and those for the wider police force
area, minus the treatment areas and a surrounding buffer zone into which
crime might have been displaced or crime control benefits diffused. Implemen-
tation of alley gates reportedly took place over a period of three years and so
there was no simple before and after period. Consequently, in the present
analysis we examined the changes observed in each of the 108 housing blocks
for the relevant pre- and post-intervention periods and compared these to the
changes in the control area (see above) for the same intervals of time. Figure 3
shows odds ratios (ORs) and confidence intervals for these 108 gated blocks.
The black dots represent the point estimates, whilst the horizontal lines show
the 95% confidence intervals within which the actual value of the OR is most
likely to fall. It is apparent that the ORs are overwhelmingly positive, suggest-
ing that, relative to the wider police force area, the rate of burglary (per unit
time) typically declined faster in the gated street blocks. Note a weighted
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Figure 3 Odds ratios for the 108 alley-gated blocks evaluated in Bowers et al. (2004).
Ratios over 1 favor treatment—those with CIs not including 1 are statistically significant.
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mean effect size is shown in the figure but this should be treated with caution
as there was dependency in the control area data.8
Meta-analysis
We now examine the trends observed in the six alley gating studies where data
were available for both treatment and control areas, before and after alley
gates were installed. For most of the studies there was a simple before and
after period. However, in the case of the Bowers et al. (2004) study, as noted
above, implementation was gradual—only 5 per cent of alley gates were fitted
Figure 4 Forest plot of the findings for the six locations where alley gates were
installed and where data were available.
8. As noted, for each of the 108 blocks, the before and after periods differed. However, the con-
trol area was always the wider police force area minus the treatment and surrounding buffer areas.
As such, the same area (albeit at different times) was used as a control for each gated block. For
the 108 individual point estimates considered independently, this is unproblematic. However, when
computing an overall estimate of effect size, one assumption of the approach used to estimate the
standard errors is that the observations are independent. Since the same geographic area is used
as the control area in each case, this assumption is violated and the standard error of the overall
estimate of effect size may be underestimated.
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in the first year of the study. To deal with this, we aggregate across the blocks
and consider the “post” data as the final year of implementation.
For each study, we estimated the intervention effect by computing an odds
ratio and a confidence interval that are shown (in black) in Figure 4. An overall
weighted mean effect size was computed using a random effects model9 (see
Appendix 1). The results suggest that, relative to the changes observed in the
control areas, burglary numbers fell at a faster rate in the areas in which alley
gates were installed. In four of the locations, this effect was statistically sig-
nificant. The overall weighted mean effect size of 1.73 (confidence intervals:
1.21-2.48) was also statistically significant and suggests that, relative to the
control areas, burglary declined substantially in the areas where alley gating
was implemented.
We looked for any dependency in the data, explored heterogeneity and out-
liers, and checked for possible publication bias. We did not detect outliers and
therefore are reassured that exceptions did not have an impact on the analy-
sis. All but one of the studies (Bowers et al., 2004) appeared in gray (i.e. non-
academic) literature and thus the findings cannot logically be attributable to
publication bias, in the narrowest sense.10 However, as so few studies were
available for analysis, it is possible that the results so far presented do not
capture the variation that would be observed in a larger population of studies
(if it existed).
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Figure 5 Funnel plot with two further imputed studies (white dots).
9. An estimate of the heterogeneity observed across studies (Q = 13.18, df = 5, p < 0.05) indicated
that the use of a random effects model was warranted. Each study contributed one effect size only
to the mean effect size so dependency in the data was not an issue.
10. Publication bias can arise not just from ignoring the gray literature, but also because of selec-
tive reporting on the part of authors or the preferential publication of positive results by scientific
journals.
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A variety of procedures are available to examine the possible effects of
missing studies. We used the trim and fill algorithm proposed by Duval and
Tweedie (2000) which imputes the “missing” points on a funnel plot using an
iterative procedure which continues until the plot is symmetric. This yields an
adjusted estimate of effect size. Figure 5 shows the trim and fill results, sug-
gesting that 2 studies are missing (these are the two additional points, illus-
trated here as white dots). The original point estimate in log units was 0.717
and confidence intervals 0.171-1.264.11 The adjusted point estimate is 0.283,
with confidence intervals of 0.231-0.335. These results demonstrate that
accounting for possible missing studies, whilst resulting in a slightly more mod-
est effect size, does not affect the initial conclusions of the meta-analysis.
Two issues warrant mention at this point. First, publication bias exercises
such as trim-and-fill are potentially less reliable with smaller populations of
studies (for a discussion see Duval & Tweedie, 2000). Second, and of particular
relevance to the study of context (or Moderators), is the fact that publication
bias is only one of a number of sources that can lead to asymmetry in funnel-
plots. Others are documented by Egger, Smith, Schneider, and Minder (1997)
and include: location biases, true heterogeneity (e.g. intensity of intervention
or differences in underlying risk making the effect size truly differ with study
size), data irregularities and measurement artifacts. Ideally, we would conduct
a moderator analysis to see if the effect of alley gates varies systematically
with particular study characteristics (e.g. in different contexts), and use this
in funnel plot interpretation. Unfortunately low numbers preclude such an
analysis. However, these caveats aside, the analysis above illustrates that if
funnel-plot asymmetry were due to missing studies their addition would not
significantly adjust the findings of the meta-analysis. Hence this serves as a
useful sensitivity test.
Spatial displacement
Since alley gates may be associated with spatial displacement or the diffusion
of crime control benefits, where possible we examined any changes in crime
outcomes in the immediately surrounding areas (or buffer zones). Data were
available for five of the six studies (not Agar, 2011). In four of these studies,
changes were examined in a surrounding buffer area and for one period of
time post-intervention. In the case of the Bowers et al. (2004) study, data
were available for two different buffer areas that surrounded the treatment
area (200 m and 1 km wide). In what follows, we analyze the data for the
former (200 m) and define the post-intervention period as the final year of
implementation (see above).
11. Note that these estimates do not compensate for over-dispersion.
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For each buffer area we computed an odds ratio in the way described
above. This procedure—computing a separate effect for the buffer area—was
recently used in a systematic review of spatial displacement (Bowers et al.,
2011). The results of these analyses are shown in gray in Figure 4. In each
case, burglary declined in the buffer areas at a rate that exceeded observed
changes in the control areas. There are two leading explanations for this find-
ing. The first is that rather than displacing crime, alley gating appeared to be
associated with a diffusion of crime control benefits. That is, the positive
effect of the intervention spread to an area wider than the treatment bound-
ary. The weighted mean effect size (computed using a random effects model)
of 1.62, also shown in Figure 4, was statistically significant.12
An alternative explanation is that the reductions in burglary observed for
both treatment and buffer areas can be attributed to a selection bias,
whereby, for example, there might be a general tendency for both treatments
and buffers to be situated in high crime areas, and are therefore likely to both
experience regression to the mean, falsely presenting as reduction effects.
Whilst the latter seems less likely as a result of measurement of change
against a control, it can’t be ruled out with the exclusive use of before and
after quasi-experimental designs. Bowers et al. (2004) reported the findings of
a time series analysis, which demonstrate a clear dose-response association
between the timing and intensity of implementation and crime reduction. This
study also examined changes in the spatial distribution of crime more pre-
cisely, and showed that the reductions observed in the buffer zone exhibited a
distance decay pattern, with the majority of the reduction being evident
immediately adjacent to the treatment areas.
Mechanisms
We now turn to the realist branch of our review, drawing on a broader range
of studies than those included in our meta-analysis. To reiterate, “mecha-
nisms” are taken here to describe “how” and “why” alley gates might con-
tribute to crime reduction. On reading the 43 studies judged relevant to alley
gating, we identified six dominant mechanisms through which alley gates might
generate positive crime prevention outcomes, though in many scenarios these
causal mechanisms might be expected to operate in concert. In addition, we
identified a seventh mechanism through which alley gates might contribute to
increases in crime.
It should be noted that the studies considered as part of our realist review
did not contain empirical evidence on mechanisms (or moderators), a point we
return to in the Discussion. For that reason, what follows is not a quantitative
12. A similar but marginally non-significant mean effect size was found using the 1 km in Bowers
et al. (2004).
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summary of the evidence but instead more of a qualitative review of what was
described in the primary studies. Moreover, oftentimes study authors did not
describe alley gating using terms such as “mechanisms”. Consequently, it was
often difficult to attribute suggested mechanisms to particular studies. In this
review, however, where studies did explicitly refer to the causal mechanisms
presumed to be responsible for the observed outcomes, this is acknowledged.
Increasing the Effort
Alley gating puts physical barriers in the way of would-be offenders and, quite
literally, makes it harder to commit crime (e.g. see Agar, 2011; Armitage,
2006; Green, 2005; Kay, Hearnden, Millie, Mallender, & Kingsnorth, 2002).
Prospective offenders are unable to access targets (such as properties to bur-
gle) or use the alleys as a way to escape the scene of crime and evade detec-
tion. The gates also restrict access to the alley which previously provided an
enclosed and potentially unsupervised location to commit crime (such as drug
dealing). Crucially, unlike other mechanisms described below, an increase-
effort mechanism places relatively little emphasis on the actions of affected
residents. The only requirement this mechanism makes of residents is the dili-
gent closure of the gates.
Territoriality, Guardianship and Surveillance
Alley gates might prevent crime by increasing the (perceived) risk of commit-
ting an offense by extending guardianship and assisting natural surveillance.
Theories of “defensible space” suggest residents assume little control or
responsibility for areas occupied by numerous anonymous residents (Newman,
1972). Gating—especially if coupled with signs of ownership (such as the
hanging of plants in the gated alley)—might function to generate a sense of
ownership or territoriality. The creation of community sentiments around well-
defined shared space behind gates may increase informal social control
(Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). By converting once public space into
private space, residents could be motivated to take greater pride and care for
the alley (through, say, installing plants and trellises and maintaining a clean
environment) and feel more empowered to act as capable guardians (Cohen &
Felson, 1979), challenging those who may have no legitimate reason to be
present.
Many alley gating initiatives in Britain were funded by monies designed to
encourage community regeneration and cohesiveness, which speaks to this
mechanism (Rogers, 2013). However, changes in potential indicators of
guardianship and surveillance before and after the installation of alley gates
were not systematically tested in the literature reviewed. Johnson and Loxley
(2001) report anecdotal evidence of residents in Manchester (UK) installing
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plants and shrubbery in reclaimed (gated) alleys, which they interpreted as
signs of affected residents taking greater pride in their area, and evidence of
residents in Liverpool (UK) being reportedly more comfortable using alleyways
once they are gated. Unlike the increase-effort mechanism discussed above, to
operate effectively this mechanism asks a great deal of affected residents. It
assumes that changes to the physical environment (gating) will initiate a
change in the behavior of residents, in particular a willingness to display
greater “togetherness” in ways that resonate with and ultimately deter
prospective offenders.
Removing Excuses
Through blocking off alleys, gates might create symbolic indicators of private
space which would mean that anyone crossing the newly created threshold
would feel at an increased likelihood of being challenged by affected resi-
dents. If this mechanism were activated, it would not matter if alley gates
failed to comprise a physical barrier that made entry more difficult or if the
gates were not always locked; gates could simply act as a persuasive indicator
of a boundary between public and private space, within which resident inter-
vention is more likely.
“Fixing” Broken Windows
The “broken windows” mechanism suggests that failure to control antisocial
behavior leads to signs of incivility that in turn creates the impression that fur-
ther criminal behavior is normal and permissible (Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg,
2008; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). In the context of alley gates, open access alleys
often comprise unregulated spaces where signs of disorder are produced, cre-
ating a permissive environment for crime. Closing them creates orderly space
providing cues to suggest that this is not a suitable place to offend because
the risk of disruption, detection or arrest is high. Operated effectively, the
gate leads to the maintenance of an ordered environment that is cared for
because residents take ownership of it.
The activation of this mechanism is dependent on whether residents and
various local authorities (i.e. refuse collectors, street cleaners and potentially
the police) are motivated to keep the space within gated areas tidy and cared
for. Information from residents collected several years after the installation of
alley gates suggests that such ordered environments are indeed commonplace.
Armitage and Smithson (2007), for example, found residents in gated areas
reported encountering considerably fewer cases of littering, dog fouling and
public urination than they had previously.
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Deflection
Areas known to have many alleys may attract offenders because of the tempt-
ing crime targets expected there. Alley-rich areas therefore feature in the
“awareness spaces” of more individuals, some of whom will act upon available
crime opportunities (Brantingham & Brantingham, 2008). Gating some alleys
could reduce the attractiveness of the area more generally and remove it from
the awareness space of criminally inclined individuals (Armitage, 2006). If acti-
vated, this mechanism might plausibly generate crime falls in local streets
without alley gates as well as those with them—a diffusion of benefits—as was
suggested by our meta-analysis.
Increases in Offending Through Reductions in Guardianship
Through extending guardianship and improving natural surveillance, alley gat-
ing is presumed to generate positive crime prevention outcomes. However,
potentially they could function to increase offending. If alleys were previously
well-used by residents in their day-to-day routines, gating them might function
to reduce their usage, increase offenders’ perceptions of anonymity and
thereby increase crime. Haywood et al. (2009) described how gating led to a
reduction in footfall in an alley which had previously conveniently linked a
park and food store. This was thought to be associated with an increase in bur-
glaries because would-be offenders felt less likely to be observed than before.
Indeed, gating might remove alleys from the routine surveillance of passers-by
who would otherwise act as capable guardians. Rogers (2013) found that resi-
dents in gated areas in Wales seldom used alleys following the installation of
gates, particularly after dark. Unfortunately the study was unable to assess
whether reduced usage of alleys was associated with increases in crime.
Moderators
The mechanisms underpinning crime reduction measures are rarely, if ever,
activated unconditionally. Moderators are understood here to refer to distinct
contexts (such as different physical locations) or to the pre-existing conditions
of a place (for example, the historical nature of a particular neighborhood)
that might facilitate or undermine the success of interventions. Moderators are
distinct from matters associated with implementation which are discussed in
the next section.
Neighborhood Context
The profile of the residents affected by alley gates is important. Gating will be
less effective if access to gate keys is not well-regulated or if the number
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combination of gate key-pads (where used) becomes widely known. Where
neighborhoods have a high turnover of residents, the number of residents with
access to keys and passcodes may increase. For example, Millie and Hough
(2004) describe a burglary reduction project where alley gates were installed
in an area characterized by a large student population. It proved difficult to
keep track of the keys and residents often propped the alley gates open.
Resident and Community Investment in Alley Gating
To operate effectively, gating is often dependent on changes in the behavior
of residents. Where residents do not take personal responsibility for informally
regulating the gates, effectiveness is likely to be reduced (Haywood et al.,
2009). Residents need to incorporate the gates into their daily routines, some-
thing which is likely to take time. The existence of committed residents might
not be essential but their presence will likely increase the probability of acti-
vating crime reduction mechanisms. In this regard, Haywood et al. (2009) note
that gates are not simply physical interventions but “living” ones relying on
ongoing buy-in and commitment from residents to make them work.
Community Cohesion
Gating programs might function to generate community cohesion which in turn
might lead residents to work together cooperatively to prevent crime. How-
ever, this cannot be assumed. The successful installation and operation of
alley gate schemes might be dependent on the existence of an already cohe-
sive community. High crime rate neighborhoods are often associated with low
social cohesion (e.g. Hirschfield & Bowers, 1997; Sampson, Morenoff, &
Gannon-Rowley, 2002). Given that gating programs are generally—though not
always—proposed as a solution in high crime areas, this may make them diffi-
cult to deliver. Areas characterized by high numbers of renters or a high turn-
over of residents might be especially problematic as they may lack the interest
in working together to introduce safety measures in a locale where they have
little long-term investment. Indeed, home ownership is so important that it
may inoculate against many of the problems of implementing alley gating in
high crime rate locations (Rogers, 2013).
In some circumstances bringing residents together has undermined community
cohesiveness. Mutual hostility between advocates and opponents of schemes
may generate a fractured community. Haywood et al. (2009) reported the dele-
terious effect that one awkward resident, who would not close the gates and
made threats when approached by residents to do so. Concerted efforts to
resolve the situation made little difference to the behavior of this aggressive
individual. The sense of fear amongst residents participating in Haywood et al.’s
(2009, p. 376) research “demonstrates the dependency of the implementation
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and operation of gating on the cooperation of all scheme residents and the frag-
ile nature of community cohesion”. Indeed, in the most extreme cases alley
gates, although mooted to promote cohesiveness, may function to generate a
more exclusive and divided society (Rogers, 2013), in ways similar to those found
for gated communities (see Addington & Rennison, 2013).
Physical Environment
The “broken windows” mechanism described previously assumes that alley
gates help contribute to an orderly and cared for environment, which might
function to discourage offenders. However, evidence suggests that this can be
undermined. Build-up of rubbish behind gates appears frequently in the litera-
ture and could be interpreted as indicating an uncared for area (Rogers, 2006).
This may occur where residents are unable to access the alleys or where refuse
collectors decline to enter the gated alleyways or do not have access to them.
This can be linked to the design and installation of the gates themselves. Some
gates have proved unfit for purpose. In one study in the UK, Thompson et al.
(2002a, p. 14) observe that “it became clear the gates were inappropriate.
They quickly became rusty and unsightly, could be “kicked in” relatively easily
and residents found them very noisy”.
Implementation
There are a number of guides concerned with the implementation of alley
gates (see Armitage, 2006; Beckford & Cogan, 2000; Johnson & Loxley, 2001).
The following is a narrative summary of the practical tasks intended to create
conditions within which alley gating is most likely to work effectively.
Consultation with and Consent of Residents
A precursor to successful alley gating is gaining the consent of residents. Many
studies discuss this matter, underscoring its importance (Adamson, 2005;
Armitage & Smithson, 2007; Bowers et al., 2004; Haywood et al., 2009;
Johnson & Loxley, 2001; Rogers, 2006, 2007, 2013; Sturgeon-Adams, Adamson,
& Davidson, 2005). In Britain, agreement by local residents is necessary before
alleys can be gated and the majority of property owners must consent.
Resident Commitment to and Use of Gates
Following on from the above, residents need to agree on the rules that govern
the use of the gates and be committed to following those rules if alley gates
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are to function effectively. Studies have revealed that where residents do not
consent they will not use them properly, leaving them insecure (Haywood
et al., 2009; Rogers, 2013). Residents commonly express concerns about the
arrangements for the maintenance of gates, the impact on services and utili-
ties such as rubbish collection, noise, access to keys, wheelchair access, safety
and a stigmatizing impact on a neighborhood (Adamson, 2005; Johnson &
Loxley, 2001; Millie & Hough, 2004; Sturgeon-Adams et al., 2005). Community
buy-in and engagement needs to be both initially stimulated and maintained.
Since the population will invariably change over time, the nature of problems
in an area may evolve and residents might otherwise “forget” what the gates
were originally intended to achieve and why (Rogers, 2007, 2013).
Routine Gate Locking
The literature is replete with examples of residents failing to lock or close the
gates and in so doing undermining potential crime prevention mechanisms
(although this is not always the case, see Armitage & Smithson, 2007). This
can happen for a number of reasons. Otherwise supportive residents may
become frustrated where the gates are inconvenient and leave them open. It
follows that resident misuse of the gates might be compounded where unsuit-
able gates and lock procedures have been implemented. Some gates are not
easy to lock. Others are not self-closing. Unsupportive residents may purpose-
fully undermine gating initiatives.
Consultation with Local Authorities
Early consultation with local service providers potentially affected by the gat-
ing of alleys is necessary to ensure that local services (from emergency ser-
vices to the regular collection of rubbish) are not compromised and relevant
personnel can access the alleys. There may also be matters to do with cables,
wires, pipes and sewers under the ground that need to be considered.
The “Status” of the Alley
Implementation of alley gates rests on identifying ownership of the alleys. In
the UK alleys are sometimes public rights of way owned by local authorities. In
these circumstances establishing alley gates can be complex and time consum-
ing. The local authority may be required to transfer ownership of the land to
local residents who in turn would be responsible for maintaining it. This process
can be costly and requires negotiations with the local authority. In other cir-
cumstances alleys are owned privately by one or more residents. If so, they can
be closed with permission of all home owners, provided they can be identified.
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Features of the Gates
Successful operation of alley gating will depend on whether a suitable gate/lock
combination has been selected. Where the gates are operated with locks and
keys, decisions need to be made about who distributes the keys (for example
the police or a residents’ group), how to handle keys/key codes in areas where
turnover of residents is high and when to change key pad codes (which are
likely to become widely known over time). The gate needs to be appropriate
for the site (potentially to facilitate access to vehicles and people). It needs to
be strong (but not so solid that it inhibits natural surveillance) and large enough
to prevent people jumping over it. The gate might need lighting at night time.
There needs to be consideration of esthetics as well as security. The design will
depend on the physical dimensions of the alley, the amount of money available
to pay for it and what local residents want. In some circumstances gates need
planning permission from a local government authority. Reaching agreement for
who is responsible for maintaining the gate over time is important.
Economics
Our final section is based only on those six studies included in our meta-analy-
sis, all of which included information on the costs associated with alley gating
(Table 1). The financial costs of gating include installing, insuring and main-
taining the gates as well as consulting the community, particularly those whose
property is likely to be most affected. These costs will also vary according to
the number of affected residents, the number of gates installed, the type of
alley gate and so on. In four of the six studies, the estimated cost per gate
was reported and, in the remaining two (marked by an asterisk), we were able
to compute costs by dividing the reported total expenditure on alley gating by
the number of gates installed. Across the six studies the median cost per alley
gate was £726. The lowest reported cost per gate was £158 and the highest
was £1,453.
The significance of any financial outlay should be judged in light of expected
returns on investment. For crime prevention, returns ordinarily refer to the
financial gains associated with crimes averted following intervention. This can
be calculated using published estimates on the average cost of various crime
types (see Dubourg & Hamed, 2005). Five of the six studies included in our
meta-analysis generated cost-benefit ratios to assess the total amount spent
on burglary reduction against the estimated savings (or losses) associated with
burglary reductions (or increases). These are displayed in Table 2 and denote
the financial loss or savings for every one pound spent.
Four of the five studies reported cost beneficial results. Several points
should be kept in mind, however, when interpreting the findings in Table 2.
Firstly, cost benefit analysis was performed using the total amount spent on all
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burglary reduction measures and not specific interventions (such as alley
gates). Moreover, in all but one study (the exception being Bowers et al.,
2004) alley gates were evaluated as part of a suite of measures designed to
reduce burglary. Second, Kay et al. (2002) and Thompson, Hearnden, Millie,
Mallender, and Kingsnorth (2002a, 2002b) report several cost benefit ratios
which vary according to whether displacement/diffusion of crime control bene-
fits is included or not. In some cases the difference is considerable. In Ford-
bridge, for example, Thompson and colleagues report cost benefit ratios of
£1.24 to £9.32 for every £1 spent, the former incorporating changes in burglary
in the surrounding buffer area and the latter focusing on burglary as a
proportion of all acquisitive crime in the target area. Here, we report only the
lower estimates.
Discussion
Using the EMMIE framework (Johnson et al., 2015) to structure our review, we
collated information on the effectiveness of alley gates, the causal mecha-
nisms through which they are expected to work, the conditions necessary to
activate such mechanisms, the implementation of alley gates and the eco-
nomic costs and benefits of doing so. The results from our meta-analysis sug-
gest that alley gating has been an effective burglary reduction measure, albeit
with modest effect sizes. Our findings are interpreted cautiously, however,
given the small number of studies eligible for meta-analysis (n = 6), all of
which used quasi-experimental designs. This warrants mention given previous
research has found that non-randomized study designs are more likely to pro-
duce positive results than when randomisation is used (see Weisburd, Lum, &
Petrosino, 2001).
Table 2 Cost-benefit ratios of amount spent on alley gating and the associated costs
of burglary reductions and/or increases
Author and date Setting Cost benefit ratio
Bowers et al. (2004) Merseyside, UK £1:£1.86
Kay et al. (2002) Selly Oak, UK £1:£2.79*
Sturgeon-Adams et al. (2005) Hartlepool, UK £1:£2.19
Thompson et al. (2002a) Fordbridge, UK £1:£1.24*
Thompson et al. (2002b) Stirchley, UK £1:£1.87*
Notes. Those studies marked by an asterisk denote modeled costs which “convert costs to a
common price base (GDP deflated) and point in time (discounted). The modeled costs for Stirchley
SDP use net present values at April 1999 prices, and the cost of capital items (equipment) as an
amortized value, based on the expected life of the assets and the time they were used in the
intervention. This assumes that the assets continue to be available beyond the end of the project”
(Thompson et al. 2002a, p. 25).
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Table 3 Hypothesized context-mechanism-outcome configurations for alley gates
Context Mechanism Outcome
Offenders select targets
with which they are
familiar
Closing alleys removes
vulnerable properties from
likely offenders’ awareness
spaces
Reduction of domestic
burglary, non-domestic
burglary and theft from the
garden and yards accessible
from the alleyAlleys provide easy access
to targets or a means of
escape for offenders
Closing alleys might
increase the effort for the
offender and increase the
risk of being apprehended
Public alleys provide a
legitimate excuse for
would-be offenders to
survey properties
Closing alleys removes
excuses for loitering
Alley gates are installed in
high crime areas with
little social cohesion
The process of securing
agreement for alley gates to
be installed builds social
cohesion, enhancing mutual
protection
Open access alleys
generate disorder and
facilitate further crime
and disorder
Closing alleys creates
orderly space, providing
cues to suggest that this is
not a suitable place to
offend because the risk of
detection/apprehension is
high
Reduction of drug use and
dealing, prostitution, arson,
the accumulation of litter,
robbery and anti-social
behavior
Open access alleys are
unregulated, no-one
takes proprietary
interest and disorderly
behavior goes
unchallenged
Alley gates create
defensible space where
those backing onto the
enclosed alleys display
territoriality over it
Alley gates are installed in
high crime areas with
little social cohesion
The process of securing
agreement for alley gates to
be installed builds social
cohesion, enhancing mutual
protection
Areas known to have many
rear alleys attract
would-be offenders
Alley gating reduces the
attractiveness of the
neighborhood for offenders
who are looking for
vulnerable targets
A diffusion of benefits
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There are also several factors that limit the generalizability of our findings.
First, all of the studies included in our meta-analysis examined British alley
gating programs. It is unclear whether the generally positive results obtained
from these studies can be generalized to other settings with different street
layouts and housing characteristics. Second, in five of the six studies (the
exception is Agar, 2011) the alley gates were purchased using funds provided
by the same government scheme (the Reducing Burglary Initiative, see Homel,
Nutley, Webb, & Tilley, 2004). In some cases the injection of money was con-
siderable. This is noteworthy since efforts to replicate well-resourced demon-
stration projects at a reduced cost often fail to produce the same positive
outcomes (see Tilley, 1993). Third, we found that alley gates tended to be
implemented as part of a package of crime prevention measures. Although this
is true of many crime prevention schemes, and is a familiar limitation when
synthesizing such studies (see Bennett, Holloway, & Farrington, 2008), we must
reiterate the consequent inability to reliably determine the comparative effec-
tiveness of individual interventions.
Drawing on a wider range of studies than those included in our meta-
analysis, this review also attempted to identify the causal mechanisms through
which alley gating might plausibly reduce crime. Table 3 outlines the outcomes
that are expected to follow from the activation of particular mechanisms in
given contexts.
By far the most commonly assumed mechanism in the literature we
reviewed was that alley gates produce a crime reduction effect by increasing
the effort of prospective offenders. A virtue of this mechanism is that it
requires little input from affected residents, its only requirement is that the
gates are regularly closed—it is therefore comparatively context-insensitive.
The same cannot be said for some of the other mechanisms through which
alley gates might conceivably reduce crime—such as removing excuses for
loitering, creating orderly spaces and so on—all of which have higher thresh-
olds of activation and variously require input from affected parties (such as
residents, municipal agencies, police).
Although we contend that the information reported here on mechanisms and
moderators is relevant to decision-makers who are considering investing in
alley gating, an important observation in undertaking this review is that the
evidence gleaned is, for the most part, only suggestive of how alley gating
may produce effects and the conditions that are relevant to variations in out-
come patterns. It had been hoped that the data collected from primary studies
included in our meta-analysis would enable a moderator analysis to test con-
jectures about mechanisms and the conditions for their activation. Unfortu-
nately, such data were not available in the studies reviewed here. Future
primary evaluation studies should focus on collecting data on these underlying
mechanisms (see also Weisburd, Hinkle, Braga, & Wooditch, 2015). This may
require primary data collection, such as the use of observation methods to
determine the extent to which alley gates are closed or the presence of signs
of disorder before and after the installation of alley gates. Collecting such
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numbers would enable a much sharper evaluation of alley gating, and help in
determining whether the putative mechanisms described here are responsible
for the outcome patterns associated with alley gating.
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Meta-Analytic Formulae
Proportional Change Analysis
To compute confidence intervals:
ESi ¼ p
k
(1)
SEi ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p 1 pð Þ
n
r
(2)
xi ¼ 1
SE2i
(3)
where ESi is the measure of effect size for study location i, SEi is the standard error of
the estimate, ωi is the inverse variance weight, n is the count of crime pre-intervention,
and p is the proportional change.
To compute an overall weighted measure of effect size we use the equation:
ES ¼
Pn
i¼1 xi  ESiP
xi
(4)
Odds Ratios
The odds ratio is computed as follows:
OR ¼ Trtbefore  Ctrlafter
Trtafter  Ctrlbefore (5)
For computational reasons, the standard error (SE) is calculated for the natural loga-
rithm of the OR (LOR = loge(OR)) rather than the raw OR. The formula for computing
the SE for LOR is as follows (IF is an inflation factor, see below):
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SELOR ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
Trtbefore
þ 1
Trtafter
þ 1
Ctrlbefore
þ 1
Ctrlafter
s
 2 (6)
Confidence intervals are then computed in the usual way (by multiplying the SE by
1.96 and adding and subtracting this value from the LOR to get the upper and lower
estimates of the interval) and the estimates are then exponentiated to make the values
easier to interpret in terms of the difference in likelihood of a positive outcome
between the treatment and control groups.
Estimating Mean Effect Sizes
To do this, we first computed the inverse variance weights for each OR using the
formula shown in (3). The weighted mean effect size is then simply:
OR ¼
Pðxi  LORiÞP
xi
(7)
The above (fixed effects) formula assumes that any variation in effect sizes observed
across locations (or studies) is due to sampling error alone. However, it is also possible
that there is real variation across studies (e.g. due to contextual differences). To
account for this, we use a random effects model to compute the weighted mean effect
size (see Lipsey & Wilson, 2001), this essentially serves to increase the estimated
standard error of the estimates.
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